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American Films Abroad, Segrave

Posted on 2010.02.09 at 00:32
This text is a very anti-American portrait of the Hollywood majors.

It's a list of the kind of block-booking that Hollywood Majors do in international distribution.


pg. 188 "Film Historian Manjunath Pendakur remarked, "Through their block-booking policy, the leading American producer-distributors controlled almost of the screen time available in the Canadian firtt-run market." For 1977 the eight largest film distributors in Canada--all subsidiares of U.S. firms--took in 77.8 percent of the total film rental income, while the other 75 distributors shared the remaining 22.2 percent. Of the gross receiptsthe eight majors remitted 67.1 percent of it to America--dollars in New York. No Canadian producer received any royalities from those eight companies. In cities and towns where independnet houses operated in competition to the cinemas affiliated with the dominant circuits, the independents did not get any first run films from the majors. It was a matter of policy not to offer first-run product to independnets in the same market where either of the two major circuits oeprated.

pg. 189 "Top admission price in Lima, Peru, was 21 cents U.S., Picker felt all South American nations had good business conditions and were ona sound economic basis, and there fore he saw no reason why the "po9verty level" admission rates should not be raised."

pg. 190 Would not release Guns of Navarone until Mexico increased ticket prices.

(The problem with this model is that it really focuses on Hollywood as this single mass, blanket entity. Just the majors)

CIC is an offshore consortium of Paramount, Universal, and MGM)

(This is a ground level study, very specific case studies, unlike Guback, Scott who often use charts)


pg. 194, Using film as a national foreign policy as Eric Johnston goes from country to country.

pg. 195 Tells of a story that uses an example of showing films in Indonesia. Where ideology is equal to selling things, and selling consumerism. (If America has done a good job with capitalist consumerism, perhaps the Japanese have done much better?)

pg. 196 Majors control 68.83 % of the domestic market in 1970.

pg. 198, the producer distributor share of a film

pg. 199 BLAME THE INDEPENDENTS FOR THEIR LOW BUDGET QUICKIES, THEY ARE ALL RAUNCHY SEX FILMS

pg. 200, Edward R. Murrow claims films are bleak and exaggerated representations of America

Webb Pomerene: Sponsored by Rep. Edwin Y. Webb (D) of North Carolina and Sen. Atlee Pomerene (D) of Ohio, Webb-Pomerene Act gave immunity to antitrust laws for companies that combined to operate the export trade that was essential to the war effort. The act was important because it granted exemptions from the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914. Many large conglomerates that had previously been subject to Federal anti-trust investigations were now free to continue "business as usual" because they "aided" the war effort. Webb-Pomerene exemptions lasted well into the 1920s as the Federal Trade Commission granted stays of investigation for those companies that initially qualified for exemption under the 1918 act.

pg. 202 "Hollywood is notorious for its creative accounting, as mentioned herein for the 1930s and ahead in the 1980s section. It is possible for every film to 'lose' money--through apportinoing fixed costs as a percentage of a film's budget and having one arm of a company buyt costumes and sell them to a second arm at inflated prices...

pg. 202 Does it cost more to export films?

pg. 203 breakdown of film finance, banking funded by expot-import bank

pg. 203 Frozen money...

pg. 206 "New York Times writer Bosley Crowther broke no new ground when he stated 'no nation's film indsutry can prosper to any continuing extent just on the domestic sale of its films."

pg. 207 Norway blocks films after Hollywood tries to take 40 percent of box office

Allen Scott--Cinema, Culture, Globalization

Posted on 2010.02.07 at 01:29
pg. 170
Monopolistic competition, not imitation, is the pathway to long-term viability for industrial agglomerations seeking to carve out a place for themselves in markets that are already swamped by the outputs of a dominant center of production. Dominant centers, by defintion, have massive stocks of the competitive advantages that in the first instance have propelled their product lines into leading positions on world markets. Effective market contestation by subdominant centers, then, calls at least for some unique competitive asset that dominant centers cannot match. Additionally, and at the risk of some repetition, even if certain alternative production centers were able to accomplish the goal of making films with unique appeal on wider global market, they would still not find it easy to achieve significant growth and repeated commercial success if they lacked the capacity to distribute and market their films on a large scale.

[Here, this is referring to a conglomerate like vertical integration present in Hollywood]


pg. 171 A high number of the world's conglomerates originate outside of the US. It is very odd to think of hegemony, and conglomerate domination when corporations are transnational and do not obey any singular ideological stance.

pg. 171, Major congloms realize the future potential of different markets and want to start working in their now.

Make an Appointment with USC Libraries

Posted on 2010.02.07 at 00:30
The Cinematic Arts Library's Archives of Performing Arts contains the following studio collections: MGM, Universal Studios, Twentieth Century-Fox, Hal Roach, Republic Pictures, Carolco Pictures and, in an affiliated collection, the complete Warner Bros. Archives. Included are such varied materials as scripts, production records, memos and correspondence, stills, scrapbooks, pressbooks, sketches and drawings, music scores, editing notes and more, reflecting the diversity of artistry in the fields of film and television.

Mini-majors

Posted on 2010.02.07 at 00:14
'Mini-Major' Studios Coming of Age.
By GALLOWAY, STEPHEN
Publication: Los Angeles Business Journal
Date: Monday, April 30 2001
As the major Hollywood studios grapple with ways to become more cost-efficient, as evidenced last week by the Walt Disney Co.'s announcement that it plans to cut 4,000 jobs, a leaner type of entertainment force is reemerging on the scene.

They are the "mini-majors," a type of company

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that had essentially disappeared after the prior generation - Miramax Films, New Line Cinema, etc. -- was swallowed piecemeal by the major studios.
Now a new handful of such companies is emerging -- with unrivaled power and influence outside the major Hollywood studios.

Each one has deep financial pockets and a range of business interests from film and television production to video and cable. Each either has or is developing a substantial library of film titles, and each has a fierce belief in itself.

The new mini-majors include Artisan Entertainment, maker of "The Blair Witch Project"; Alliance Atlantis, a Canadian-based backer of pictures like "The Sweet Hereafter" and "Crash"; and Lions Gate Entertainment, best known for "Gods and Monsters" and "Shadow of the Vampire."

Some would argue that the new mini-majors also include cash-rich entities like Intermedia ("The Wedding Planner") and Initial Entertainment Group ("Traffic"). But these are largely movie production and financing ventures that don't yet have the same far-reaching, multimedia tentacles of the other companies.

Most of these companies are unknown to the average movie-goer, but they are increasingly leaving their mark on the movie business as a place where filmmakers can go to make fully financed pictures that will be distributed independently of the studios.

"There is always room for mini-majors," said Steve Stabler, the guiding force behind the recently shuttered mini-major, Destination Films. "There's only six majors, and there are 36,000 movie screens in the country to fill."

But just what a mini-major needs to succeed in today's ferociously competitive environment is subject to debate.

For Lions Gate CEO Jon Feltheimer, two things are essential: diversified interests and the ability to do in-house theatrical distribution.

"We believe that being (a mini-major) means being a diversified entertainment company with multiple revenue streams," he said. "And when I use the term 'mini-major,' I also mean a company that has a built-in distribution system."

Mini-majors' capabilities

Lions Gate and Artisan both have big U.S. distribution divisions that can open a movie just like a studio; Intermedia and Alliance Atlantis don't have this yet.

But Intermedia makes up for it by being able to finance very big films with stars like Harrison Ford and Jennifer Lopez, which it then sells to the studios.

And Alliance Atlantis compensates by having distribution deals in countries all over the world, which account for more than 60 percent of a film's business.

"It's a big world out there," noted Alliance President Peter Sussman.

Still, Sussman conceded that his company hopes to have a domestic distribution system down the road, as part of a larger business plan to become a full-fledged studio.

All these companies have built their business on releasing films that are quite different from the average, lowest-common-denominator studio fare - and that's just the way the new mini-majors want it.

With the studios turning more and more to broad-based entertainment that cuts across all demographics, the mini-majors are trying to tailor their product to specific segments of the marketplace.

Both Feltheimer and Artisan CEO Amir Malin believe their success is dependent on finding an audience that the studios don't reach - whether through art-house releases or cutting-edge, youth-oriented product.

Alliance Atlantis has also followed this strategy, although it recently broadened out to make more commercial films than its traditional art-house fare, including the $25 million-plus "51st State" with Samuel L. Jackson, due out later this year.

But Sussman said these larger-scale films are the exception rather than the rule.

Cutting-edge niche

Intermedia, which makes bigger-budget fare, also believes in movies that are a notch above most studio films.

"We tend to make pictures that are content-driven, that are about something, that are director-driven," said Intermedia Co-Chairman Nigel Sinclair, citing pictures like the Sydney Pollack-produced 'The Quiet American" with Brendan Fraser, slated for release next year. "The niche that the mini-majors fill is to provide more diversified choice for talent, and in some ways be a little more on the cutting edge."

In aiming to make non-studio-type films, Sinclair and his colleagues in the other new mini-majors have learned the lessons of their predecessors well.

In the early days, New Line and Miramax made niche-oriented films targeted at a specific marketplace. New Line specialized in youth-oriented genre product like "A Nightmare on Elm Street," while Miramax specialized in upscale art-house pictures like "A Room With a View." Both accumulated important film libraries that made them very desirable to the studios.

But unlike the fledgling New Line and Miramax (which made their names before the proliferation of satellite, cable, video-on-demand and other "ancillary" markets), the new minimajors strongly believe in hedging their bets across the board. They have operations in television production, television sales, video and cable.

In the case of Lions Gate, that means activities that mm the gamut from animation to broadband, while Alliance Atlantis not only has film and TV activities (like the CBS hit "CSI: Crime Scene Investigation"), but also owns several cable networks.

Efficient operations

A key aspect to these mini-majors is that they have the flexibility and low overhead that allow them to create content cheaper and quicker than the studios.

"We don't have the vestigial structure of studios that are 50 or 60 years old," noted Feltheimer. "We don't have people who have been here 10, 20 or 30 years. And we have much smaller staffs."

But Feltheimer, for one, knows there are many functions a studio performs that his company cannot.

"We have great disadvantages compared to studios," he admitted. "We don't have the size or scope of their library. We don't have their capitalization, their access to credit, their muscle with the buyers, their huge output deals, We don't own a network or cable line. We are a little PT boat firing our missiles in between the big nuclear blasts of the majors."

And when the little missiles go awry, the results can prove disastrous.

Earlier this year, one of the most talked about new mini-majors, Destination, closed its doors - less than three years after being formed with more than $100 million in funding.

Stabler, the producer who founded the company but exited it early on, believes Destination's subsequent management risked too much on a few big pictures like "Thomas and the Magic Railroad," rather than sticking with its original plan for a larger number of lower-budget films.

While Artisan is doing much better than Destination - helped by its 6,700-title library - it has seen its value drop recently. The company turned down a buyout offer of $250 million from USA Networks a year and a half ago. Now it is in talks with an unnamed buyer for a sum closer to $150 million, according to industry sources familiar with the negotiations.

Oliver and Ohlbaum

Posted on 2010.02.07 at 00:06
http://www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/UHF%20Spectrum%20Management_ENG_FINAL_tcm6-57755.pdf

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cinema_journal/v048/48.3.newman.pdf

Berlusconi vs. Murdoch with Porn

Posted on 2010.02.06 at 22:48
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_07/b4166030281413.htm

Mini-Majors

Posted on 2010.02.06 at 22:45
Independent film distribution companies account for 28 per cent of the $51 billion global film related distribution
market – and almost 40 per cent of distribution income outside the USA. About two thirds of their distribution
income comes from DVD/VHS rights exploitation with the remainder coming equally from theatric and TV sales.

l However, the sector – which relies on a mixed supply of US indie (e.g. New Regency), Hollywood affiliate (e.g.
Miramax) and non-US independent (e.g. Pathé) films, is fragmented both within each national market and across national markets with no clear global market leaders currently able to match the major Hollywood studio distribution groups in terms of scale, reach and market clout.

l Despite this fragmentation, leading independent distributors who have managed to build some critical mass in
individual, national film markets and diversify into broader based DVD activities (such as distributing leading
national TV libraries) have typically enjoyed EBIT margins of 15 per cent or more and revenue growth of 4 to 6 per cent over the last 5 years.

l Generally financial returns are higher and risk levels are much lower in independent film distribution than in film production, where independent distributors – especially the larger ones – commit low levels of investment upfront, can diversify away from project specific film risk and can expand their video label activities into less project specific TV library exploitation.

l The independent film distribution sector – along with the rest of the film industry – faces a number of challenges over the next five years – not least the ending of the DVD migration boom, the development of high definition DVD, the rolling back of some significant film investment tax breaks and the roll out of full video on demand – and the new business models this heralds. However, the prospects for revenue growth, consolidation based synergies and profit enhancement are generally positive.

l The film sector as a whole is likely to grow by 2 to 3 per cent on average to 2012 but will be characterized by two distinct periods. The period up to 2009 will see relatively low revenue growth of 1 to 2 per cent a year as still early stage developments in high definition DVD and video on demand fail to offset continued declines in the core DVD markets of the developed world. There will also be a slight correction in the level of film investment growth as the sector adjusts to its lower revenue growth path from 2004 onwards and as some national tax breaks and subsidies are rolled back.

l From 2009 to 2012, however, industry revenue growth rates should pick up again to 3 to 4 per cent a year as high definition DVD and video on demand full roll out bring some dynamism back to the home entertainment and TV related markets.

l Overall, the $14.6 billion independent film related distribution sector should see revenues grow by at least 1 to 2
per cent a year on average through the 2006 to 2012 period, but with the leading players in the process of
global industry consolidation achieving higher than average revenue growth rates of 3 to 4 per cent a year –
and profit margin enhancement through reduced costs, improved market share and better terms of trade with
both producers and retail outlets.

MINI-MAJORS

Posted on 2010.02.06 at 22:33
http://www.oando.co.uk/publications/OandO-middlemen-summary.pdf

GLOBAL MEDIA GIANTS

Posted on 2010.02.06 at 22:24
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1406

The Global Media Giants
We are the world

By Robert McChesney

A specter now haunts the world: a global commercial media system dominated by a small number of superpowerful, mostly U.S.-based transnational media corporations. It is a system that works to advance the cause of the global market and promote commercial values, while denigrating journalism and culture not conducive to the immediate bottom line or long-run corporate interests. It is a disaster for anything but the most superficial notion of democracy--a democracy where, to paraphrase John Jay's maxim, those who own the world ought to govern it.

The global commercial system is a very recent development. Until the 1980s, media systems were generally national in scope. While there have been imports of books, films, music and TV shows for decades, the basic broadcasting systems and newspaper industries were domestically owned and regulated. Beginning in the 1980s, pressure from the IMF, World Bank and U.S. government to deregulate and privatize media and communication systems coincided with new satellite and digital technologies, resulting in the rise of transnational media giants.

How quickly has the global media system emerged? The two largest media firms in the world, Time Warner and Disney, generated around 15 percent of their income outside of the United States in 1990. By 1997, that figure was in the 30 percent-35 percent range. Both firms expect to do a majority of their business abroad at some point in the next decade.

The global media system is now dominated by a first tier of nine giant firms. The five largest are Time Warner (1997 sales: $24 billion), Disney ($22 billion), Bertelsmann ($15 billion), Viacom ($13 billion), and Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation ($11 billion). Besides needing global scope to compete, the rules of thumb for global media giants are twofold: First, get bigger so you dominate markets and your competition can't buy you out. Firms like Disney and Time Warner have almost tripled in size this decade.

Second, have interests in numerous media industries, such as film production, book publishing, music, TV channels and networks, retail stores, amusement parks, magazines, newspapers and the like. The profit whole for the global media giant can be vastly greater than the sum of the media parts. A film, for example, should also generate a soundtrack, a book, and merchandise, and possibly spin-off TV shows, CD-ROMs, video games and amusement park rides. Firms that do not have conglomerated media holdings simply cannot compete in this market.

The first tier is rounded out by TCI, the largest U.S. cable company that also has U.S. and global media holdings in scores of ventures too numerous to mention. The other three first-tier global media firms are all part of much larger industrial corporate powerhouses: General Electric (1997 sales: $80 billion), owner of NBC; Sony (1997 sales: $48 billion), owner of Columbia & TriStar Pictures and major recording interests; and Seagram (1997 sales: $14 billion), owner of Universal film and music interests. The media holdings of these last four firms do between $6 billion and $9 billion in business per year. While they are not as diverse as the media holdings of the first five global media giants, these four firms have global distribution and production in the areas where they compete. And firms like Sony and GE have the resources to make deals to get a lot bigger very quickly if they so desire.

Behind these firms is a second tier of some three or four dozen media firms that do between $1 billion and $8 billion per year in media-related business. These firms tend to have national or regional strongholds or to specialize in global niche markets. About one-half of them come from North America, including the likes of CBS, the New York Times Co., Hearst, Comcast and Gannett.Most of the rest come from Europe, with a handful based in East Asia and Latin America.

In short, the overwhelming majority (in revenue terms) of the world's film production, TV show production, cable channel ownership, cable and satellite system ownership, book publishing, magazine publishing and music production is provided by these 50 or so firms, and the first nine firms thoroughly dominate many of these sectors. By any standard of democracy, such a concentration of media power is troubling, if not unacceptable.

But that hardly explains how concentrated and uncompetitive this global media power actually is. In addition, these firms are all actively engaged in equity joint ventures where they share ownership of concerns with their "competitors" so as to reduce competition and risk. Each of the nine first-tier media giants, for example, has joint ventures with, on average, two-thirds of the other eight first-tier media giants. And the second tier is every bit as aggressive about making joint ventures. (See chart below for the extent of joint ventures between media giants.)

We are the world

In some ways, the emerging global commercial media system is not an entirely negative proposition. It occasionally promotes anti-racist, anti-sexist or anti-authoritarian messages that can be welcome in some of the more repressive corners of the world. But on balance the system has minimal interest in journalism or public affairs except for that which serves the business and upper-middle classes, and it privileges just a few lucrative genres that it can do quite well--like sports, light entertainment and action movies--over other fare. Even at its best the entire system is saturated by a hyper- commercialism, a veritable commercial carpetbombing of every aspect of human life. As the C.E.O. of Westinghouse put it (Advertising Age, 2/3/97), "We are here to serve advertisers. That is our raison d'etre."

Some once posited that the rise of the Internet would eliminate the monopoly power of the global media giants. Such talk has declined recently as the largest media, telecommunication and computer firms have done everything within their immense powers to colonize the Internet, or at least neutralize its threat. The global media cartel may be evolving into a global communication cartel.

But the entire global media and communication system is still influx. While we are probably not too far from crystallization, there will likely be considerable merger and joint venture activity in the coming years. Indeed, by the time you read this, there may already be some shifts in who owns what or whom.

What is tragic is that this entire process of global media concentration has taken place with little public debate, especially in the U.S., despite the clear implications for politics and culture. After World War II, the Allies restricted media concentration in occupied Germany and Japan because they noted that such concentration promoted anti-democratic, even fascist, political cultures. It may be time for the United States and everyone else to take a dose of that medicine. But for that to happen will require concerted effort to educate and organize people around media issues. That is the task before us.


This article and the following corporate profiles are based on The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism (Cassell, 1997), co-authored with Edward S. Herman. The Global Media can be ordered by calling 1-800-561-7704.



Time Warner
$25 billion - 1997 sales

Time Warner, the largest media corporation in the world, was formed in 1989 through the merger of Time Inc. and Warner Communications. In 1992, Time Warner split off its entertainment group, and sold 25 percent of it to U.S. West, and 5.6 percent of it to each of the Japanese conglomerates Itochu and Toshiba. It regained from Disney its position as the world's largest media firm with the 1996 acquisition of Turner Broadcasting.

Time Warner is moving toward being a fully global company, with over 200 subsidiaries worldwide. In 1996, approximately two-thirds of Time Warner's income came from the United States, but that figure is expected to drop to three-fifths by 2000 and eventually to less than one-half. Time Warner expects globalization to provide growth tonic; it projects that its annual sales growth rate of 14 percent in the middle 1990s will climb to over 20 percent by the end of the decade.

Music accounts for just over 20 percent of Time Warner's business, as does the news division of magazine and book publishing and cable television news. Time Warner's U.S. cable systems account for over 10 percent of income. The remainder is accounted for largely by Time Warner's extensive entertainment film, video and television holdings. Time Warner is a major force in virtually every medium and on every continent.

Time Warner has zeroed in on global television as the most lucrative area for growth. Unlike News Corporation, however, Time Warner has devoted itself to producing programming and channels rather than developing entire satellite systems. Time Warner is also one of the largest movie theater owners in the world, with approximately 1,000 screens outside of the United States and further expansion projected.

The Time Warner strategy is to merge the former Turner global channels--CNN and TNT/Cartoon Channel--with their HBO International and recently launched Warner channels to make a four-pronged assault on the global market. HBO International has already established itself as the leading subscription TV channel in the world; it has a family of pay channels and is available in over 35 countries. HBO President Jeffrey Bewkes states that global expansion is HBO's "manifest destiny."

CNN International, a subsidiary of CNN, is also established as the premier global television news channel, beamed via ten satellites to over 200 nations and 90 million subscribers by 1994, a 27 percent increase over 1993. The long-term goal for CNN International is to operate (or participate in joint ventures to establish) CNN channels in French, Japanese, Hindi, Arabic and perhaps one or two other regional languages. CNN launched a Spanish-language service for Latin America in 1997, based in Atlanta. CNN International will also draw on the Time Warner journalism resources as it faces new challenges from news channels launched by News Corporation and NBC-Microsoft.

Before their 1996 merger, Turner and Time Warner were both global television powers with the TNT/Cartoon Network and Warner channels, drawing upon their respective large libraries of cartoons and motion pictures. Now these channels will be redeployed to better utilize each other's resources, with plans being drawn up to develop several more global cable channels to take advantage of the world's largest film, television and cartoon libraries.

Time Warner selected holdings

Majority interest in WB, a U.S. television network launched in 1995 to provide a distribution platform for Time Warner films and programs. It is carried on the Tribune Company's 16 U.S. television stations, which reach 25 percent of U.S. TV households;

Significant interests in non-U.S. broadcasting joint ventures;

The largest cable system in the United States, controlling 22 of the largest 100 markets;

Several U.S. and global cable television channels, including CNN, Headline News, CNNfn, TBS, TNT, Turner Classic Movies, The Cartoon Network and CNN-SI (a cross-production with Sports Illustrated);

Partial ownership of the cable channel Comedy Central and a controlling stake in Court TV;

HBO and Cinemax pay cable channels;

Minority stake in PrimeStar, U.S. satellite television service;

Warner Brothers and New Line Cinema film studios;

More than 1,000 movie screens outside of the United States;

A library of over 6,000 films, 25,000 television programs, books, music and thousands of cartoons;

Twenty-four magazines, including Time, People and Sports Illustrated;

Fifty percent of DC Comics, publisher of Superman, Batman and 60 other titles;

The second largest book-publishing business in the world, including Time-Life Books (42 percent of sales outside of the United States) and the Book-of-the-Month Club;

Warner Music Group, one of the largest global music businesses with nearly 60 percent of revenues from outside the United States;

Six Flags theme park chain; The Atlanta Hawks and Atlanta Braves professional sports teams; Retail stores, including over 150 Warner Bros. stores and Turner Retail Group; Minority interests in toy companies Atari and Hasbro.



Disney
$24 billion - 1997 sales

Disney is the closest challenger to Time Warner for the status of world's largest media firm. In the early 1990s, Disney successfully shifted its emphasis from its theme parks and resorts to its film and television divisions. In 1995, Disney made the move from being a dominant global content producer to being a fully integrated media giant with the purchase of Capital Cities/ABC for $19 billion, one of the biggest acquisitions in business history.

Disney now generates 31 percent of its income from broadcasting, 23 percent from theme parks, and the balance from "creative content," meaning films, publishing and merchandising. The ABC deal provided Disney, already regarded as the industry leader at using cross-selling and cross-promotion to maximize revenues, with a U.S. broadcasting network and widespread global media holdings to incorporate into its activities.

Consequently, according to Advertising Age (8/7/95), Disney "is uniquely positioned to fulfill virtually any marketing option, on any scale, almost anywhere in the world." It has already included the new Capital Cities/ABC brands in its exclusive global marketing deals with McDonald's and Mattel toymakers. Although Disney has traditionally preferred to operate on its own, C.E.O. Michael Eisner has announced Disney's plans to expand aggressively overseas through joint ventures with local firms or other global players, or through further acquisitions. Disney's stated goal is to expand its non-U.S. share of revenues from 23 percent in 1995 to 50 percent by 2000.

Historically, Disney has been strong in entertainment and animation, two areas that do well in the global market. In 1996 Disney reorganized, putting all its global television activities into a single division, Disney/ABC International Television. Its first order of business is to expand the children- and family-oriented Disney Channel into a global force, capitalizing upon the enormous Disney resources. Disney is also developing an advertising-supported children's channel to complement the subscription Disney Channel.

For the most part, Disney's success has been restricted to English-language channels in North America, Britain and Australia. Disney's absence has permitted the children's channels of News Corporation, Time Warner and especially Viacom to dominate the lucrative global market. Disney launched a Chinese-language Disney Channel based in Taiwan in 1995, and plans to launch Disney Channels in France, Italy, Germany and the Middle East. "The Disney Channel should be the killer children's service throughout the world," Disney's executive in charge of international television states.

With the purchase of ABC's ESPN, the television sports network, Disney has possession of the unquestioned global leader. ESPN has three U.S. cable channels, a radio network with 420 affiliates, and the ESPN Sports-Zone website, one of the most heavily used locales on the Internet. One Disney executive notes that with ESPN and the family-oriented Disney Channel, Disney has "two horses to ride in foreign markets, not just one."

ESPN International dominates televised sport, broadcasting on a 24-hour basis in 21 languages to over 165 countries. It reaches the one desirable audience that had eluded Disney in the past: young, single, middle-class men. "Our plan is to think globally but to customize locally," states the senior VP of ESPN International. In Latin America the emphasis is on soccer, in Asia it is table tennis, and in India ESPN provided over 1,000 hours of cricket in 1995.

Disney plans to exploit the "synergies" of ESPN much as it has exploited its cartoon characters. "We know that when we lay Mickey Mouse or Goofy on top of products, we get pretty creative stuff," Eisner states. "ESPN has the potential to be that kind of brand." Disney plans call for a chain of ESPN theme sports bars, ESPN product merchandising, and possibly a chain of ESPN entertainment centers based on the Club ESPN at Walt Disney World. ESPN has released five music CDs, two of which have sold over 500,000 copies. In late 1996, Disney began negotiations with Hearst and Petersen Publishing to produce ESPNSports Weekly magazine, to be a "branded competitor to Sports Illustrated."

Disney selected holdings

The U.S. ABC television and radio networks;

Ten U.S. television stations and 21 U.S. radio stations;

U.S. and global cable television channels Disney Channel, ESPN, ESPN2 and ESPNews; holdings in Lifetime, A & E and History channels;

Americast, interactive TV joint venture with several telephone companies;

Several major film, video and television production studios including Disney, Miramax and Buena Vista;

Magazine and newspaper publishing, through its subsidiaries, Fairchild Publications and Chilton Publications;

Book publishing, including Hyperion Books and Chilton Publications;

Several music labels, including Hollywood Records, Mammoth Records and Walt Disney Records;

Theme parks and resorts, including Disneyland, Disney World and stakes in major theme parks in France and Japan;

Disney Cruise Line;

DisneyQuest, a chain of high-tech arcade game stores;

Controlling interests in the NHL Anaheim Mighty Ducks and major league baseball's Anaheim Angels;

Consumer products, including more than 550 Disney retail stores worldwide.



Bertelsmann
$15 billion - 1996 sales

Bertelsmann is the one European firm in the first tier of media
giants. The Bertelsmann empire was built on global networks of book and
music clubs. Music and television provide 31 percent of its income, book
publishing 33 percent, magazines and newspapers 20 percent, and a global
printing business accounts for the remainder. In 1994 its income was
distributed among Germany (36 percent), the rest of Europe (32 percent),
the United States (24 percent) and the rest of the world (8 percent).

Bertelsmann's stated goal is to evolve "from a media enterprise with
international activities into a truly global communications group."
Bertelsmann's strengths in global expansion are its global distribution
network for music, its global book and music clubs, and its facility
with languages other than English. It is working to strengthen its music
holdings to become the world leader, through a possible buyout of--or
merger with--EMI and through establishing joint ventures with local
music companies in emerging markets. Bertelsmann is considered to be the
best contender of all the media giants to exploit the Eastern European
markets.

Bertelsmann has two severe competitive disadvantages in the global
media sweepstakes. It has no significant film or television production
studios or film library, and it has minimal involvement in global
television, where much of the growth is taking place. The company began
to address this problem in 1996 by merging its television interests
(Ufa) into a joint venture with Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de
Telediffusion (CLT), the Luxembourg-based European commercial
broadcasting power. According to a Bertelsmann executive, the CLT deal
was "a strategic step to become a major media player, especially in
light of the recent European and American mergers."

Bertelsmann selected holdings

German television channels RTL, RTL2, SuperRTL
and Vox;

Part ownership of Premiere, Germany's largest pay-TV channel;

Stakes in British, French and Dutch TV channels;

50 percent stake in CLT-Ufa, which owns 19 European TV channels and
23 European radio stations;

Eighteen European radio stations;

Newspaper and magazine publishing, including more than 100
magazines;

Book publishing, with some 40 publishing houses, concentrating on
German-, French- and English-language (Bantam and Doubleday Dell)
titles;

Major recording studios Arista and RCA;

Leading book and record clubs in the world.



Viacom
$13 billion - 1997 sales

C.E.O. Sumner Redstone, who controls 39 percent of Viacom's
stock, orchestrated the deals that led to the acquisitions of Paramount
and Blockbuster in 1994, thereby promoting the firm from $2 billion in
1993 sales to the front ranks. Viacom generates 33 percent of its income
from its film studios, 33 percent from its music, video rentals and
theme parks, 18 percent from broadcasting, and 14 percent from
publishing. Redstone's strategy is for Viacom to become the world's
"premier software driven growth company."

Viacom's growth strategy is twofold. First, it is implementing an
aggressive policy of using company-wide cross-promotions to improve
sales. It proved invaluable that MTV constantly plugged the film
Clueless in 1995, and the same strategy will be applied to the
Paramount television program based on the movie. Simon & Schuster is
establishing a Nickelodeon book imprint and a "Beavis and Butthead" book
series based on the MTV characters. Viacom also has plans to
establish a comic-book imprint based upon Paramount characters, it is
considering creating a record label to exploit its MTV brand name
and it has plans to open a chain of retail stores to capitalize upon its
"brands" ^ la Disney and Time Warner. In 1997 Paramount will begin
producing three Nickelodeon and three MTV movies annually. "We're just
now beginning to realize the benefits of the Paramount and Blockbuster
mergers," Redstone stated in 1996.

Second, Viacom has targeted global growth, with a stated goal of
earning 40 percent of its revenues outside of the United States by 2000.
As one Wall Street analyst puts it, Redstone wants Viacom "playing in
the same international league" with News Corporation and Time Warner.
Since 1992 Viacom has invested between $750 million and $1 billion in
international expansion. "We're not taking our foot off the
accelerator," one Viacom executive states.

Viacom's two main weapons are Nickelodeon and MTV.
Nickelodeon has been a global powerhouse, expanding to every
continent but Antarctica in 1996 and 1997 and offering programming in
several languages. It is already a world leader in children's
television, reaching 90 million TV households in 70 countries other than
the United States--where it can be seen in 68 million households and
completely dominates children's television.

MTV is the preeminent global music television channel,
available in 250 million homes worldwide and in scores of nations. In
1996 Viacom announced further plans to "significantly expand" its global
operations. MTV has used new digital technologies to make it
possible to customize programming inexpensively for different regions
and nations around the world.

Viacom selected holdings

Thirteen U.S. television stations;

A 50 percent interest in the U.S. UPN television network with
Chris-Craft Industries;

U.S. and global cable television networks, including MTV,
M2, VH1, Nickelodeon, Showtime,
TVLand and Paramount Networks;

A 50 percent interest in Comedy Central channel (with Time
Warner);

Film, video and television production, including Paramount Pictures;

50 percent stake in United Cinemas International, one of the world's
three largest theater companies;

Blockbuster Video and Music stores, the world's largest video rental
stores;

Book publishing, including Simon & Schuster, Scribners and
Macmillan;

Five theme parks.



News Corporation
$10 billion - 1996 sales

The News Corporation is often identified with its head, Rupert
Murdoch, whose family controls some 30 percent of its stock. Murdoch's
goal is for News Corporation to own multiple forms of programming--news,
sports, films and children's shows--and beam them via satellite or TV
stations to homes in the United States, Europe, Asia and South America.
Viacom CEO Sumner Redstone says of Murdoch that "he basically wants to
conquer the world."

And he seems to be doing it. Redstone, Disney CEO Michael Eisner, and
Time Warner CEO Gerald Levin have each commented that Murdoch is the one
media executive they most respect and fear, and the one whose moves they
study. TCI's John Malone states that global media vertical integration
is all about trying to catch Rupert. Time Warner executive Ted Turner
views Murdoch in a more sinister fashion, having likened him to Adolf
Hitler.

After establishing News Corporation in his native Australia, Murdoch
entered the British market in the 1960s and by the 1980s had become a
dominant force in the U.S. market. News Corporation went heavily into
debt to subsidize its purchase of Twentieth Century Fox and the
formation of the Fox television network in the 1980s; by the
mid-1990s News Corporation had eliminated much of that debt.

News Corporation operates in nine different media on six continents.
Its 1995 revenues were distributed relatively evenly among filmed
entertainment (26 percent), newspapers (24 percent), television (21
percent), magazines (14 percent) and book publishing (12 percent). News
Corporation has been masterful in utilizing its various properties for
cross-promotional purposes, and at using its media power to curry
influence with public officials worldwide. "Murdoch seems to have
Washington in his back pocket," observed one industry analyst after News
Corporation received another favorable ruling (New York Times,
7/26/96). The only media sector in which News Corporation lacks a major
presence is music, but it has a half-interest in the Channel V
music television channel in Asia.

Although News Corporation earned 70 percent of its 1995 income in the
United States, its plan for global expansion looks to continental
Europe, Asia and Latin America, areas where growth is expected to be
greatest for commercial media. Until around 2005, Murdoch expects the
surest profits in the developed world, especially Europe and Japan. News
Corporation is putting most of its eggs in the basket of television,
specifically digital satellite television. It plans to draw on its
experience in establishing the most profitable satellite television
system in the world, the booming British Sky Broadcasting
(BSkyB). News Corporation can also use its U.S. Fox
television network to provide programming for its nascent satellite
ventures. News Corporation is spending billions of dollars to establish
these systems around the world; although the risk is considerable, if
only a few of them establish monopoly or duopoly positions the entire
project should prove lucrative.

News Corporation selected holdings

The U.S. Fox broadcasting network;

Twenty-two U.S. television stations, the largest U.S. station group,
covering over 40 percent of U.S. TV households;

Fox News Channel;

A 50 percent stake (with TCI's Liberty Media) in several U.S. and
global cable networks, including fx, fxM and Fox Sports
Net;

50 percent stake in Fox Kids Worldwide, production studio and owner
of U.S. cable Family Channel;

Ownership or major interests in satellite services reaching Europe,
U.S., Asia, and Latin America, often under the Sky Broadcasting brand;

Twentieth Century Fox, a major film, television and video production
center, which has a library of over 2,000 films to exploit;

Some 132 newspapers (primarily in Australia, Britain and the United
States, including the London Times and the New York Post),
making it one of the three largest newspaper groups in the world;

Twenty-five magazines, most notably TV Guide;

Book publishing interests, including HarperCollins;

Los Angeles Dodgers baseball team.



Sony
$9 billion - 1997 sales (media only)

Sony's media holdings are concentrated in music (the former CBS
records) and film and television production (the former Columbia
Pictures), each of which it purchased in 1989. Music accounts for about
60 percent of Sony's media income and film and television production
account for the rest. Sony is a dominant entertainment producer, and its
media sales are expected to surpass $9 billion in 1997. It also has
major holdings in movie theaters in joint venture with Seagram. As
Sony's media activities seem divorced from its other extensive
activities--Sony expects $50 billion in company-wide sales in
1997--there is ongoing speculation that it will sell its valuable
production studios to vertically integrated chains that can better
exploit them.

Sony was foiled in its initial attempts to find synergies between
hardware and software, but it anticipates that digital communication
will provide the basis for new synergies. Sony hopes to capitalize upon
its vast copyrighted library of films, music and TV programs to leap to
the front of the digital video disc market, where it is poised to be one
of the two global leaders with Matsushita. Sony also enjoys a 25 percent
share of the multi-billion-dollar video games industry; with the shift
to digital formats these games can now be converted into channels in
digital television systems.



TCI
$7 billion - 1996 sales

TCI (Tele-Communications Inc.) is smaller than the other firms in
the first tier, but its unique position in the media industry has made
it a central player in the global media system. TCI's foundation is its
dominant position as the second biggest U.S. cable television system
provider. C.E.O. John Malone, who has effective controlling interest
over TCI, has been able to use the steady cash influx from the lucrative
semi-monopolistic cable business to build an empire.

Malone understands the importance of the U.S. cable base to bankroll
TCI's expansion; in 1995 and 1996 he bought several smaller cable
systems to consolidate TCI's hold on the U.S. cable market. TCI faces a
direct and potentially very damaging challenge to its U.S. market share
from digital satellite broadcasting. It is responding by converting its
cable systems to digital format so as to increase channel capacity to
200. TCI is also using its satellite spin-off to position itself in the
rival satellite business and retain some of the 15 to 20 million
Americans expected to switch from cable broadcasting to satellite
broadcasting by 2000. In addition to owning two satellites valued at
$600 million, TCI holds a 21 percent stake in Primestar, a U.S.
satellite television joint venture with the other leading U.S. cable
companies, News Corporation and General Electric, which already had 1.2
million subscribers in l996.

TCI has used its control of cable systems to acquire equity stakes in
many of the cable channels that need to be carried over TCI to be
viable. TCI has significant interests in Discovery, QVC,
Fox Sports Net, Court TV, E!, Home Shopping
Network and Black Entertainment TV, among others. In 1996,
TCI negotiated the right to purchase a 20 percent stake in News
Corporation's new Fox News Channel in return for access to TCI
systems. Through its subsidiary Liberty Media, TCI has interests in 91
U.S. program services.

Nor does TCI restrict its investments to cable channels and content
producers. It has a 10 percent stake in Time Warner as well as a 20
percent stake in Silver King Communications, where former Fox
network builder Barry Diller is putting together another U.S. television
network.

TCI has applied its expansionist strategy to the global as well as
domestic media market. On the one hand, TCI develops its core cable
business and has become the global leader in cable systems, with strong
units in Britain, Japan and Chile. Merrill Lynch estimates that TCI
International's cable base outside of the United States will increase
from 3 million subscribers in 1995 to 10 million in 1999.

On the other hand, TCI uses its cable resources to invest across all
global media and to engage in numerous non-cable joint ventures. "When
you are the largest cable operator in the world," a TCI executive
states, "people find a way to do business with you." It already has 30
media deals outside of the United States, including a venture with Sega
Enterprises to launch computer game channels, a joint venture with News
Corporation for a global sports channel, and a 10 percent stake in Sky
Latin America.



Universal (Seagram)
$7 billion - 1997 sales

Effectively controlled by the Bronfman family, the global
beverage firm Seagram purchased Universal (then MCA) from Matsushita for
$5.7 billion in 1995. Matsushita was unable to make a success of MCA and
had refused to go along with MCA executives who had wanted to acquire
CBS in the early l990s. Universal is expected to account for
approximately half of Seagram's $14 billion in sales in 1997.

Over half of Universal's income is generated by the Universal
Studios' production of films and television programs. Universal is also
a major music producer and book publisher and operates several theme
parks. As many of the broadcast networks and cable channels vertically
integrate with production companies, Universal has fewer options for
sales and is less secure in its future. It owns the cable USA
Network and the Sci-Fi Network, after buying out its uneasy
partner Viacom.



NBC (GE)
$5 billion - 1996 sales

General Electric is one of the leading electronics and
manufacturing firms in the world with nearly $80 billion in sales in
1996. Its operations have become increasingly global, with non-U.S.
revenues increasing from 20 percent of the total in 1985 to 38 percent
in 1995, and an expected 50 percent in 2000. Although NBC currently
constitutes only a small portion of GE's total activity, after years of
rapid growth it is considered to be the core of GE's strategy for
long-term global growth.

NBC owns U.S. television and radio networks and 11 television
stations. It has been aggressive in expanding into cable, where it now
owns several cable channels outright, like CNBC, as well as
shares in some 20 other channels, including the A&E network.
The most dramatic expression of GE's media-centered strategy is its 1996
alliance and joint investment with Microsoft to produce the cable news
channel MSNBC, along with a complementary on-line service. From
this initial $500 million investment, NBC and Microsoft plan to expand
MSNBC quickly into a global news channel, followed perhaps by a
global entertainment and sports channel. NBC and Microsoft are also
developing a series of TV channels in Europe aimed at computer users.



The Second Tier

Below the global giants in the media food chain is a second tier of corporations that fill regional or niche markets. Some of these firms are as large as the smaller global companies, but lack their world-wide reach. A few second-tier companies may attempt, through aggressive mergers and acquisitions of like-sized firms, to become full-blown first-tier global media giants; others will likely be swallowed by larger companies amassing ever greater empires.

U.S.

Westinghouse $5 billion
Advance Publications $4.9 billion
Gannett $4.0 billion
Cox Enterprises $3.8 billion
Times-Mirror $3.5 billion
Comcast $3.4 billion
McGraw Hill $3 billion
Reader's Digest $3 billion
Knight-Ridder $2.9 billion
Dow Jones $2.5 billion
New York Times Co. $2.5 billion
Tribune Co. $2.2 billion
Hearst $2 billion
Washington Post Co. $1.8 billion
Cablevision $1.1 billion
DirecTV (Owned by General Motors)
DreamWorks

Canada

Thomson $7.3 billion
Rogers Communications $2 billion
Hollinger

Latin America

Cisneros Group (Venezuela) $3.2 billion
Globo (Brazil) $2.2 billion
Clarin (Argentina) $1.2 billion
Televisa (Mexico) $1.2 billion

Europe

Havas (France) $8.8 billion
Reed Elsevier (Britain/Netherlands) $5.5 billion
EMI (Britain) $5.4 billion
Hachette (France) $5.3 billion
Reuters (Britain) $4.1 billion
Kirch Group (Germany) $4 billion
Granada Group (Britain) $3.6 billion
BBC (Britain) $3.5 billion
Axel Springer (Germany) $3 billion
Canal Plus (France) $3 billion
CLT (Luxembourg) $3 billion
Pearson PLC (Britain) $2.9 billion
United News & Media (Britain) $2.9 billion
Carlton Communications (Britain) $2.5 billion
Mediaset (Italy) $2 billion
Kinnevik (Sweden) $1.8 billion
Television Francais 1 (France) $1.8 billion
Verlagsgruppe Bauer (Germany) $1.7 billion
Wolters Kluwer (Netherlands) $1.7 billion
RCS Editori Spa (Italy) $1.6 billion
VNU (Netherlands) $1.4 billion
Prisa Group (Spain)
Antena 3 (Spain)
CEP Communications (France)

Asia/Pacific

NHK (Japan) $5.6 billion
Fuji Television (Japan) $2.6 billion
Nippon Television Network (Japan) $2.2 billion
Cheil Jedang (Korea) $2.1 billion
Tokyo Broadcasting System (Japan) $2.1 billion
Modi (India) $2 billion
Asahi National Broadcasting Co. (Japan) $1.6 billion
Toho Company (Japan) $1.6 billion
PBL (Australia) $750 million
TVB International (China)
Chinese Entertainment Television (China)
Asia Broadcasting and Communica-tions Network (Thailand)
ABS-CBN (Philippines)
Doordarshan (India)
Chinese Central Television (China)

*Most sales figures are for 1996, but some are as early as 1993.


See FAIR's Archives for more on:
New York Times
Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal
Washington Post
Gannett/USA Today
AT&T/John Malone
Knight-Ridder
Internet Media
Tribune Company
CBS
Time Warner
GE
Disney
Murdoch
Corporate Ownership

IMF reports

Posted on 2010.02.06 at 22:15
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/update/01/pdf/0110.pdf

Arguments for ideology

Posted on 2010.02.06 at 03:12
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Media_control_propaganda/Media_Control.html

congloms

Posted on 2010.02.06 at 03:06
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cool/giants/

pg. 160, Hollywood averaged 57.3% of total BO in the 1990s. But one needs to look at all of the other countries producing films.

UNESCO only gives info on number of films and not performance

Sinclair suggests 'geo-linguistic regions"

All over the world, there are dominant cetners of film production.

pg. 163 "The Cultural Imperialism Thesis"--'Above all, teh Hollywood majors have perfected a competitive strategy that relies upon their massive productive assets to pump out enormously expensive blockbuster films with dense production values able to corner significant segments of the market. Simultaneously, the majors' unparalleled distribution and marketing capacities make it possible..."

pg. 163 Michalet(1987) "The laws of globalization are called homogenization, standardization of tastes, behavior, cultrues...The Hollywood model is inseparable from American imperialism"

pg. 164, good chart of global majors

One sees duplicated efforts by foreign countries to seize their own local markets: Spain, Sweden, Japan, S. Korea, Hong Kong.

These are countries with very high local marketshares. Also, the UK has a very high marketsahre for Hollywood co-productions.

Holt's talk on new global paradigms

Posted on 2010.02.06 at 02:24
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjorjTYq_7A

International Trade...

Posted on 2010.02.05 at 00:16
"Restrictions that reduce box office receipts may also reduce distribution earnings for filmmakers who distribute their own products in foreign markets. On the other hand, if domestic distributors handle imported motion picture and television progams, domestic companies will be adversely affected." pg. 120

"pg. 121 The choice by film and program exporting companies to establish their own distribution arms in foreign markets or to use domestic distributors may be influenced by the host countries' laws regarding right of establishment. Foreign movie companies face restrictions or outright prohibitions on self-distribution in a number of countries. Close control ove the sequence in which films are released, both geographically and temporally among media, is essential to maximizing the earnings of a film.

pg. 125 "trade barriers hurt exhibitors which hurt domestic filmmakers who they're supposed to help"

pg. 127, "If the audience for American films in our theaters has grown in recent years, this sucess has enabled us to maintain in being the network of theaters to which I have just referred, and which is indispendable for the survival of the French cinema."

Piracy interrupts the flow of the revenue windows.

pg. 129"GATT is a multilateral trade agreement involving 91 signatory nations. It's primary objective is to liberalize world trade through a reduction of tariff duties on traded goods and through the establishment of trading rules and principles that are binding on member nations..

GATT says that there can be no extraordinary trading advantages, unless there is a special circumstance

GATT has a NATIONAL TREATMENT concept, pg. 130 "National treatment implies that foreign producers will receive the same access to domestic distribution systems as is available to the domestic producers.

International trade in Films...

Posted on 2010.02.04 at 23:02
On the prominence of English speakers...
"However, even if the English speaking population in comparison to the incomes indicated for other languages. However, even if the English-speaking population was assumed to be confined to six unambiguously English countries--the United States, Canada, the united Kingdom, Australia, Ireland, and new Zealand--English speakers would stil number 336 million, nearly as many as would Hindi/Urdu. In addition the GNP for these six English speaking countries is $3.36 trillion, nearly three times the GNP associated with Japaneswe

pg. 100-101 gives a breakdown of trade barriers in video, such as: lack of IP protection, quantitative restrictions, local work requirements, import quotas, taxes, earnings restrictions, subsidies, government monospsony...

-four specific threats, unauthorized exhibition, print theft, video piracy, signal theft

quantitative restrictions: how many films can show

local work requirements: "Local work requirements may be both formal and infromal. The government of France, for example, explicitly requires that all films released there be dubbed in France or in a French-speaking country of the EEC.

look at discriminatory taxes of importing films

Do mini-majors have remittances? pg. 110

Government Monosposony is government controlled distribution

Dubbing restrictions pg. 112

Other nations impose outright bans on the establishment of maintenance of film dsitribution subsidiares. in the countries of Iraw and South Korea, for example, foreign distribution branches or subsidiaries are simply prohibited.

-Video piracy undercuts locally produced content as well.

pg. 114 Earning remittances, film rental regulations...

Zizek on End of Days

Posted on 2010.02.04 at 18:01
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w9ECbDpF-1g

European Cable Television Chart

Posted on 2010.02.04 at 16:16
starts on pg. 56 of International Trade in FIlms

pg. 177 in appendix B gives a mathematical combinatorial analysis of International film trade

pg. 62 The term "free flow" is associated both with an earlier economic explanation of trade flows in media prducts and with the political doctrine concerning trade in media products that was dominant in international political bodies (most importantly, in the UNited Nations) in the decades immediately following World War II. The assumption underlying the free flow political doctrine was that the unihindered transmission of indormation across national borders was mutualy beneficial to all parties. Within this paradigm, the mass media, especially television, were seen as vehicles that facilitated the flow of information. The economic argument implicit in the free flow doctrine was articulated later when it became clear that the products of media products, it was argued, were a consequene of the more sophisticated technology employed by American firms that enabled them to produce films and television prorams at lower cost than froeign competitors could. According the the theory of comparative advatnage, both parties to a trade benefit when they each export products in which they have a cost advantage.

Herb Schiller pg. 62, "According to advocates of this paradigm, market forces alone are not sufficient to account for the dominant position of American media products, especially television programs, in Third World nations....Whether by direct 'conspiracy' or through a recognition of mutual interests, American multinational corporations are alleged to control media trade flows so as to assure that American product dominates...From the hegemony perspective, American media products, including films and, more importantly, television programs, are toosl employed by the US government and US multinationals to influence public opinion in other countries and to promote American values and products in Third World nations.

[One really needs to reevalute what one means by third world in this context. One needs to move past the ideology of American hegemony, frequently in this world where information is moving quite fast these days through internet portals. Information moves freely across the globe with certain exceptions]

[While Herb Schiller writes from that time, what one needs to do is refer to the present economic times. While fashionable, the new age has moved beyond Schiller. American domination of media is something that is still recognizably present. But one cannot make the same claims of dominance in third world countries. One still needs to go into the specificity of each country]

pg. 63 A third explanation advanced to explain the importance of American films and television programs in other countries is that American firms employ 'unfair' or anticompetitive methods to achieve their market positions. This charge arises most often with regard to film, where it is alleged hat American firms exmploy their positions as major distributors to provide favorable treatment for American films and to discrimnate against foreign films of equivalent artistic cultural merit.

..."IT attributes at least a part of the success of US video products in international markets to the fact that US firms gernerally commit more resources to production than do video producers in other countries. This difference in budgets also helps explain the fact that films and television programs from most other countries rarely success in the US market. Production budgets are larger in America because the US makes it affordable.

....pg. 64, production know-how is exportable to other countries,

the flow of SIN (Spanish language titles which comprised 1-2% of Television) goes against the hegemony argument

pg. 65 IMPORTANT QUOTE, "The popularity of American films in countries that require the use of domestic distributors and the numbers of American productions on state-owned television system both suggest that the contribution of anticompetitive practices to the success of American films and television programs in foreign markets is marginal at best.

pg. 66, the argument of affordability does not have a causal link between America and its films. Because of its large status, does that mean our tendency is to produce the most expensive cars?

pg 66 A MATTER OF LANGUAGE? "The model developed in this chapter, in combination with the information on different linguistic markets presented in the next chapter strongly suggest that the incentives provided by a populous and wealthy global English language market are responsible for the fact that American products loom so large in the internation trade in films...

BASICALLY, population of specific language, plus spending power of those countries

Domestic Opportunity Advantage: VERY IMPORTANT CONCEPT, pg. 68, basically, if you have a large domestic body, you can dominate international trade (so, then China?)

pg. 70 Why higher budgets are spent for bigger markets...

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